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ABSTRACT 
"United Against Apartheid: The South African Communist Party and the African 
National Congress, 1917-1963" explores the path taken by the South African Communist 
Party towards forging an alliance with the African National Congress in order to topple 
the Nationalist Party's apartheid regime. It examines the ideological changes experienced 
by the Communist Party while adapting to the South African context, and how these 
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Introduction 
1910 saw the creation of the Union of South Africa as a modem twentieth century 
state. The British and Afrikaner white minority created a system of class and racial super 
exploitation of the black majority through the enactment of segregationist policies. 1 The 
elections of 1948 increased and entrenched racial segregation in the Republic of South 
Africa.2 It is within this oppressive context that the Communist Party of South Africa 
(CPSA) operated in direct opposition to the state and its exploitative policies. The CPSA 
was one of the earliest enemies of South Africa's ruling British and Afrikaner political 
establishment.3 This essay will focus on the CPSA' s ideological shift as it sought to 
establish an alliance with the African National Congress (ANC) in order to overthrow the 
Nationalist Party and its apartheid regime. The time frame covered will begin with the 
rise of communism in 1917, and it will end in 1963 when the Nationalist government 
weakened the ANC and CPSA's presence in South Africa.4 The events that took place 
during these years were paramount to cementing the ANC/CPSA alliance. 
It is interesting that the ANC and the CPSA managed to cooperate in an efficient 
manner despite having somewhat of a conflicting ideology. The CPSA viewed South 
Africa's problems from a class perspective, while the ANC believed these problems were 
1 Afrikaner is the Boer name for African . As I will show later, Boers are the descendants of Dutch colonists. 
Throughout this paper I will use Afrikaner and Boer interchangeably when referring to these Dutch 
descendants. The term Black in South Africa encompasses different identity group-s. It is comprised of 
African, Indian, and Coloured groups. When only referring to the native people of South Africa, I will use 
the term African. 
2 Thomas G. Karis, "Revolution in the Making: Black Politics in South Africa," Foreign Affairs 62 (Winter, 
1983), www.jstor.org (accessed 22 January 2014), 381. 
3 Ibid. 
4 A. Lerumo, "Fighting Back Against Apartheid," in Fifty Fighting Years, ed. A. Lerumo (London : lnkululeko 
Publications, 1971), 108. 
I 
1 
caused by racial conflict. Despite their ideological differences, the two organizations 
managed to reach common ground and form a close alliance to overthrow the Nationalist 
state. Two key figures in this alliance were the ANC's Nelson Mandela and the CPSA's 
Joe Slovo. Both men shared command of Umkhonto we Sizwe, also known as MK, 
which was the military wing of the ANC/CPSA alliance. 5 Commenting on the somewhat 
improbable alliance between the ANC and the Communist Party, Mandela made the 
following statement: "I was prepared to use whatever means to speed up the erasure of 
human prejudict,; and the end of chauvinistic and violent nationalism. I did not need to 
become a Communist in order to work with them."6 Slovo remarked: "The leading 
African comrades, began to devote energy as never before to the broad Congress 
movement. It was in the 1950s that the real foundation was laid of an alliance between 
the Party and the ANC that Oliver Tambo has described as constituting the two pillars of 
our liberation struggle."7 When the Communist Party became illegal in 1950, it ceased to 
be a relevant political movement in South Africa. By working with the ANC, which 
represented the majority of South Africans, the CPSA remained a relevant factor in the 
liberation movement. Through its alliance with the ANC, the CPSA accepted that 
African national liberation was centered on issues of race and not on class conflict. I 
argue that for the Communist Party to have forged an alliance with the ANC, serious 
ideological changes were made to accommodate their new ally's agenda, which 
positioned the CPSA in an alliance based on common interests. 
5 Karis, "Revolution," 383. 
6 Nelson Mandela, Long Walk to Freedom (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1994), 121. 
7 Joe Slovo, 5/ovo (New York: Ocean Press, 1997), 104. 
2 
My analysis of the CPSA's alliance with the ANC is based mainly on two 
primary sources. The first is Nelson Mandela's autobiography, Long Walk to Freedom, 
which offers a wealth of information on the workings of the AN C and its campaigns 
against the apartheid regime. The second primary source is Joe Slovo's autobiography, 
Slovo, which provides numerous glimpses into the CPSA's battle against the British and 
Afrikaner political establishment. The two respective autobiographies also recount the 
interactions that the ANC and CPSA had while attempting to form their alliance. As 
such, I rely prin arily on Slovo and Mandela's works, as well as evidence from primary 
documents released by the Communist Party and found in A. Lemma's Fifty Fighting 
Years - a history of the CPSA. Chief Albert Luthuli's autobiography, Let my People Go, 
is also briefly examined to provide further insight on the nature of the ANC/CPSA 
interaction. All of these sources will be used to provide evidential information to support 
my hypothesis. 
The historiography regarding the CPSA's interaction with the ANC during their 
joint struggle against the South African state has received a fair amount of academic 
coverage. From the 1960s onwards, various writers have explored this alliance; however, 
most of this literature was written under the shadow of the Cold War. Sources from the 
60s, 70s, and 80s tended to be concerned with the level of communist control in the 
ANC. However, the end of the Cold War saw a change in the literature, and 
interpretations became more nuanced in their analysis of the Communist Party and the 
ANC. 
An Overview of European Industrialism and the Creation of South Africa 
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Communism in South Africa cannot be fully understood without reference to the 
industrial revolution in Europe which ultimately led to the creation of the socialist and 
communist ideologies. The intensification of industrialism in Great Britain and Western 
Europe over the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries led to excessive human 
suffering. Some classes of producers became obsolete while others were impoverished as 
production assumed a mass scale. As people began to live in increasingly higher 
concentrations within major industrial cities, working and living standards plummeted. 8 
The ascent of industrialism in Great Britain institutionalized capitalism as the 
predominant economic system - an arrangement based on physical and financial assets 
revolving around the private ownership of the means of production. 9 The human 
suffering brought about by industrialism and capitalism led to the formation of socialism 
- an ideology focused on the need to create social justice by providing individuals with 
social and economic equality to limit the gap between the rich and the poor. 
It is out of the socialist tradition that Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels conceived 
communism. The two German intellectuals referred to their ideology as scientific 
socialism, claiming they could prove scientifically that history had advanced to the point 
where socialism would be the new dominant world order. Marx and Engels both argued 
that while capitalism was an inevitable stage in human progress, it would ultimately 
break down because of its inherent exploitative nature. 10 To Marx and Engels, history 
was comprised of the class struggle between various economic and social strata present 
8 Alfred G. Meyer, Communism (New York: Random House, 1967), 11. 
9 Ernesto Screpanti, "Capitalist Forms and the Essence of Capitalism," Review of International Political 
Economy 6 (Spring, 1999), www.jstor .org (accessed 19 May 2013), 1-2. 
10 
Meyer, Communism, 11-13. 
4 
in all societies. Communism holds that capitalists (those who own the means of 
production) amass their wealth and power through the exploitation of the proletariat 
(workers who sell their labour for wages). As the proletariat's misery increases, it will 
eventually become aware of its own exploitation and rebel against its capitalist 
oppressors, thus resulting in the creation of a utopian communist society. 11 
While Europe underwent tremendous changes during the nineteenth century with 
the advent of industrialism, the lands that eventually became the Republic of South 
Africa experienced their own transformation. In 1652, the Dutch East India Company 
established a trading station at the Cape of Good Hope in South Africa. It eventually 
became the Cape colony, where the Boer (Afrikaner) identity was created. As the 
descendants of early Dutch settlers, the Boers grew in number and expanded across 
South Africa. In the Cape area, they extended their territory at the cost of the Khoi-khoi 
people, who were driven farther inland or enslaved. The Khoi-khoi had mixed with 
Portuguese, Polish, Flemish, and German settlers to create the coloured identity group in 
the Cape, which eventually fell under Boer and later British domination. 12 In 1795, the 
Cape colony rebelled against the Dutch. At the time, Holland was embroiled in the 
French Revolutionary Wars and was therefore unable to handle this rebellion. The British 
feared the Cape would fall to French control and intervened. The uprising was defeated 
and the Cape was subjected to British administration. 13 Living under British rule did not 
sit favourably with the Boers. From 1836 to 1854 they launched a massive migration to 
11 Andrew Gyorgy, Communism in Perspective (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1964), 25. 
12 Edward S. Ellis, J.H. Aiken, John A. Cooper, John Clark Ridpath, The Story of South Africa (Guelph: World 
Publishing Company, 1902), 51-52. 
13 Ibid., 57. 
5 
the outlying territories in what became known as the Great Trek. The Boers sought to 
escape British governance and to forcefully expand into new territories. The Boer treks 
led to the creation of the republics of Natal , Orange Free State and the Transvaal - also 
known as the South African Republic. By 1843, the British gained control of Natal from 
the Boers, which doubled their colonial holdings in the area. 14 
British and Boer expansion across these territories did not proceed unopposed as 
the diverse African inhabitants resisted European encroachment. On the Eastern Cape, 
the Xhosa fought the Boers and the British for many decades. They were eventually 
defeated in 1818 by British forces, which resulted in the occupation of their lands. 15 In 
Natal, the Zulu experienced prolonged fighting with Boer and British forces. They were 
defeated in 1887 by the British and their lands were incorporated into Natal. However, 
Zulu military resistance continued until it was ultimately defeated in 1906. 16 In the North, 
in the lands that became the Orange Free State, the Sotho people were weakened and lost 
a great deal of their territory and cattle to Boer wars of aggression from 1865 to 1868. 
Nonetheless, the Sotho maintained a degree of independence by agreeing to British 
protection; however, these negotiations forced them to cede even more land to the 
Europeans. 17 
Africans immersed themselves in the colonial world in various ways - one was by 
working in the rapidly expanding mines. In 1867, diamond deposits discovered at 
14 A. Lerumo, "Conquest and Dispossession," in Fifty Fighting Years, ed. A. Lerumo (London : lnkululeko 
Publications, 1971), 10-13. 
15 Ibid., 6-8. 
16 Ibid., 13-15. 
17 Ibid., 17. 
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Kimberley attracted enormous amounts of labour along with British and American 
capital investment. Within twenty years of this discovery, roughly three million British 
pounds worth of diamonds were exported. Diamond mining comprised approximately 
half of all Cape exports. By 1888, the De Beers Company established a monopoly over 
diamond mining, which destroyed competition and ensured diamond prices remained 
inflated by controlling the stone' s distribution. This centralised power allowed De Beers 
to create a racially divided labour force to increase profits through the exploitation of 
African worker.:.i. The establishment of a poorly paid labour pool set a precedent for gold 
mining and other industries to follow in the subsequent years. In the 1880s, gold was 
discovered in Witwatersrand, close to Johannesburg city, in the Transvaal. Gold mining 
was dominated by six companies, all of whom possessed the capital required to control 
the intensive mining operations. By 1899, Johannesburg employed 100,000 workers and 
produced 27 percent of the world's gold. 18 The mining sector consolidated its interests 
with the founding of the Transvaal Chamber of Mines, which became the greatest 
accumulation of capitalist strength in South Africa. 19 
Mining interests such as the De Beers Company cooperated with Afrikaner Cape 
farmers in the late 1800s to control the supply of African labour. They sought to increase 
the availability of cheap African labour through the implementation of new legislation. In 
1887 and 1892, legislation was introduced that limited the African franchise in the Cape 
by disqualifying land held in common from meeting the property standards needed for 
voting. Working and living areas in cities became more racially segregated, while the 
18 William Beinart, Twentieth-Century South Africa {New York : Oxford University Press, 2001), 27-28 . 
19 A. Lerumo, "Modern Imperialism and the Birth of the Liberation and Labour Movements," in Fifty 
Fighting Years, ed. A. Lerumo (London: lnkululeko Publications, 1971), 26. 
7 
aborted Glen Grey Act of 1894 attempted to increase the availability of cheap African 
labour and to intensify political segregation. The twentieth century saw the expansion of 
segregationist and oppressive legislation in South Africa.20 
With the discovery of the massive gold deposits in Witwatersrand, it became 
imperative for the British Empire to assume political and economic control of the 
Afrikaner Republics in the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. War between the British 
and Boers broke out in October 1899, while hostilities ended when the British emerged 
victorious with the signing of the Treaty of Vereeniging on 31 May 1902. The main 
diplomats present were Alfred Milner, the British High Commissioner for South Africa 
and Jan Christiaan Smuts, a Boer general who assaulted the Cape towards the end of the 
war. 21 Smuts went on to become heavily involved in South African politics in the 
following decades. 
Despite the rift that existed between Boers and British during the war, both 
groups found ample reasons for cooperation once hostilities ended. The Treaty of 
Vereeniging was based on the common understanding of the need to increase the 
exploitation of African labour through the elimination of African lands. After the war, 
this exploitative system was initially enforced under Milner's military government. 
British and Afrikaner interests were further interlinked with the creation of the Union of 
South Africa in 1910. The white legislatures of the Transvaal, Cape, Natal and Orange 
Free State Colonies voted to unite, while the British agreed to create an "all-white 
Parliament for the new self-governing Dominion" of South Africa. Only whites were 
permitted to vote in the provinces of this independent Dominion. The only exception was 
20 Beinart, Twentieth-Century, 29. 
21 Lerumo, "Modern Imperialism," 26. 
8 
in the Cape, where a very small portion of coloured and Africans qualified to vote based 
on the control of property; however, they could only vote for European representatives. 
Due to the economic dominance of the Transvaal, Afrikaner generals Louis Botha and 
Jan Christiaan Smuts were elected to lead the first Union government. Together, Botha 
and Smuts promoted large mining and farming interests through the increased flow of 
African labour paid at the "lowest possible rates ."22 
The Union government was favoured by both British and Afrikaners; however, 
the advent of \,Vorld War One in 1914 weakened this political unity. Botha and Smuts 
brought South Africa into the conflict as a British ally. General J. B. M. Hertzog, the 
main proponent of Afrikaner rights, did not favour an alliance with Britain against 
Germany. He broke away from the Union government and created the Nationalist Party, 
which became a proponent of neutrality and equality of rights between British and Boers. 
Botha died during the war, and Smuts thus became Prime Minister. He was defeated in 
the 1924 elections by Hertzog and his Nationalist Party, which maintained power for the 
next decade. The Great Depression of the 1930s forced Smuts and Hertzog to reconcile 
their differences and unite their opposing parties. The year 1934 saw the creation of the 
United Party, which maintained power late into the 1940s. The only Boer/Afrikaner 
dissent came in the form of D. F. Matan, who feared that Smuts ' s pro-British views 
would eventually undermine Afrikaner interests. As a result, he formed the Purified 
Nationalist Party, which became the opposition to the ruling United Party.23 During the 
22 Lerumo, "Modern Imperialism," 27-28. 
23 Edward A. Tiryakian, "Apartheid and Politics in South Africa," The Journal of Politics 22 (Nov., 1960), 
www. jstor.org (accessed 22 January 2014), 683-684. 
9 
1948 elections, Malan's Purified Nationalist Party defeated the United Party and assumed 
control of the government. 24 
Modem political and social ideas in the Republic of South Africa evolved in a 
setting marred by racial segregation and economic exploitation. The Union government 
under Smuts and Botha passed acts and laws to increase the destitution of the black 
population. In 1913, the Native Land Act was passed, which reduced the land available 
for Africans to less than 13 percent of South Africa's territory. The Act also outlawed 
sharecropping, and other forms of tenancy that did not provide labour to white farmers, 
thus reducing private African landownership, which meant that successful African 
peasants could not become "capitalist farmers."25 The Act impoverished rural Africans, 
much as the mechanization of agriculture had done in the United Kingdom. A poor and 
displaced pool of labour was thus created to be exploited by the mining companies and 
white owned farms. In the 1920s and '30s, Hertzog' s Nationalist Party introduced what 
became known as the Hertzog Bills - legislation to reinforce the political and economic 
exploitation of Africans by removing their few remaining voting rights. Segregation was 
based on many of the legislative acts introduced by Hertzog. This type of exploitative 
legislation was expanded and further entrenched by Malan's Purified Nationalist Party. 
After his electoral victory in 1948, Malan implemented apartheid, which was designed to 
increase racial separation. Africans were expected to live and develop in their own 
24 Tiryakian, "Apartheid and Politics," 685. 
25 Beinart, Twentieth-Century, 56-57. 
10 
separate racial "Homelands," which amounted to only 13 percent of the land area carved 
out in the 1913 Land Act. 26 
South Africa experienced great economic changes, and the Europeans working in 
South Africa's industrial mining centers found labour conditions even more exploitative 
and brutal than those in Europe. Most white workers were Boers who had a history of 
discrimination against Africans. As a result, the country 's urban working class was 
racially divided, which made it difficult for trade unions and socialists to appeal to both 
Europeans and Africans.27 Nevertheless, socialism took a minor foothold in the country 
due to the work of British socialists and labour activists such as David Ivon Jones, Bill 
Andrews, and Sidney Bunting. The irony is that most socialists tended to be either 
Africans or Eastern Europeans whose ideology did not appeal to the conservative Boer 
proletariat, which was represented by the right wing Labour Party.28 These vanguards of 
South African socialism helped to create the International Socialist League (ISL) in 1915 
by breaking away from the Labour Party - the ISL was the main predecessor of the 
CPSA.29 
The year 1921 saw the creation of the CPSA, which was the country ' s first 
rnmmunist party. It continued to function under this name until Malan ' s Purified 
Nationalist Party declared it illegal in 1950. The Communist Party was reconstituted as 
an underground organization in 1953, and its name was changed to the South African 
26 Thomas K. Ranuga, The New South Africa and the Socialist Vision (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1996), 
8-9. 
27 Stephen Ellis and Tsepo Sechaba, Comrades Against Apartheid (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1992), 12. 
28 
Lerumo, "Modern Imperialism," 42. 
29 
Ellis and Sechaba, Comrades, 12. 
11 
Communist Party (SACP). The CPSA started out as a European socialist organization 
(the main leaders were British men such as Jones, Andrews, and Bunting), which sought 
the removal of the capitalist system in South Africa. However, by 1928 the CPSA was 
transformed from its European roots into a party whose membership was primarily 
African. Initially, the Communist Party had trouble reconciling Marxist class struggle 
with the existence of African nationalism.30 
The African National Congress (ANC) was originally formed in 1912 in response 
to the increasingly segregationist policies of the Union government under Botha and 
Smuts. The Native Land Bill passed in 1912 was the first major attack on the remaining 
African land rights. An accumulation of oppressive policies highlighted the need for a 
national organization to represent all Africans, irrespective of tribal ancestry or 
language. 31 State oppression in the twentieth century also led to the creation of the 
African Indian Congress (AIC), and the creation of the coloured identity group's African 
People's Organization (AP0).32 The ANC itself was a small organization that drew its 
support from traditional chiefs and the African bourgeoisie. Its early goals were to work 
within the constitutional system to advance the interests of Africans; however, this 
moderate stance changed in the 1940s, during the course of the Second World War. 
Under the direction of Dr. A. P. Xuma, and later that of Dr. Albert Luthuli, the ANC was 
transformed into a mass national liberation movement.33 
30 Rob Davies, Dan O'Meara, and Sipho Dlamini, The Struggle For South Africa (London: Zed Books Ltd., 
1984), 292. 
31 Lerumo, "Modern Imperialism," 29. 
32 Ibid., 31-32. 
33 Davies, O'Meara, and Dlamini, The Struggle, 285. 
12 
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An alliance between the CPSA and the ANC should have been a practical 
impossibility. The Communist Party focused on class conflict while the ANC 
emphasized the racial problems in South Africa. During the 1930s, the ANC rejected 
( 
Marxist principles and cut ties with the CPSA. However, in the 1950s the two 
organizations merged into a close alliance to achieve African national liberation through 
the defeat of the Nationalist government and its apartheid regime. This collaboration 
survived the banning of the CPSA in 1950 and that of the ANC in 1960. To date, the 
ANC and the Communist Party remain allies in South Africa's political scene.34 
Historiography 
The historiographical tradition which covers the CPSA is comprised of three 
distinct ideologtcal strands: liberal, nationalist, and radical. Each of these schools views 
the South African conflict from a different point of view. The liberal historiographical 
interpretation is closely related to the British-influenced liberal movement in South 
Africa. Liberalism had problems reconciling its defence of white liberty with the political 
and social demands of black opposition movements. Liberals did not win a great deal of 
support with conservative Afrikaner nationalists or among the more radical black 
opposition.35 Furthermore, they tended to see the Communist Party as a radical political 
movement and not necessarily a Soviet puppet. 
34 South African History Online, "South African Communist Party (SACP)," 
http://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/south -african-communist-party-sacp (accessed 17 May 2013 ). 
35 Benjamin Kline, "The National Union of South African Students: A Case-Study of the Plight of Liberalism, 
1924-77," The Journal of Modern African Studies 23 (March, 1985), www. jstor.org (accessed: 22 January, 
2014), 139. ' 
13 
Thomas G. Karis' article "South African Liberation: The Communist Factor," 
explores the perceived communist influence within the ANC from a liberal perspective. 
According to Karis, the United States was concerned that the ANC/CPSA alliance would 
allow communists loyal to Moscow to captu're the ANC's leadership. Washington feared 
that a communist influenced ANC would easily win the vote if the Nationalist 
government was defeated.36 Karis argues that to focus on communist control of the ANC 
would not be conducive to a proper understanding of the political scene in South Africa. 
The ANC was similar to a national liberation movement as opposed to a full-fledged 
political party. Furthermore, the article holds that the CPSA did not control the ANC; 
instead, Congress leaders had simply chosen to work with communists because of their 
common opposition to the Nationalist Party and its apartheid regime. 37 
Tsepo ~echaba and Stephen Ellis' Comrades Against Apartheid offers another 
liberal overview of the Communist Party and its interaction with the ANC. The authors 
claim that the two organizations were close allies and at times both groups operated as a 
single entity. A perfect example of this convergence was the joint creation of MK, the 
military branch of the ANC/CPSA alliance. One of the book's arguments is that the 
Communist Party used the ANC as a pool from which to recruit highly capable 
individuals into its own ranks, which was the primary reason many ANC members were 
also communists.38 Both Sechaba and Ellis saw the Communist Party as a radical 
opposition movement. Part of communism's appeal was its portrayal by the media as the 
36 Thomas G. Karis, "South African Liberation: The Communist Factor," Foreign Affairs 65 (Winter, 1986), 
www.jstor.org (accessed: 12 March, 2013), 267. 
37 
Karis, "South African," 267-268. 
38 
Ell is and Sechaba, Comrades, 6-7. 
14 
greatest danger to the Nationalist Party ' s survival. However, unlike Karis, the two 
authors argue that communists had the ability to dominate the ANC leadership due to 
their ability to obtain various high-ranking leadership positions in the organization.39 
' Raymond Suttner' s The ANC Underground in South Africa is a liberal 
examination of the ANC. However, the book reserves an entire chapter to explore the 
Communist Party ' s interaction with the ANC. Suttner argues that communists did not 
dominate the ANC leadership; instead, the relationship between the two organizations 
was multi-dimensional. The CPSA made important contributions to the ANC but this did 
not mean that communists were in control of the leadership process.40 Suttner claims that 
the CPSA was a diverse organization with ideological differences based on regional and 
provincial affiliations. Communists in Cape Town adhered to a more classic form of 
Marxism, while those in the Northern Transvaal tended to mix African spiritual practices 
with Marxism. A prime example of this fusion was Flag Boshielo, who was a Central 
Committee member of the CPSA while also being a spiritual healer. 41 
Nationalist interpretations fall in line with the views of the Purified Nationalist 
Party and are ideologically conservative in outlook.42 Nationalist perceptions, such as 
Nathaniel Weyl' s Traitor 's End, view the Communist Party as an alarming organization. 
Weyl argues that South Africa triumphed and defeated a powerful and dangerous 
communist presence within the country, while maintaining a functioning parliament, the 
rule of law, and an independent judiciary system. He suggests that during the 1950s and 
39 Ellis and Sechaba, Comrades, 10. 
40 Raymond Suttner, The ANC Underground in South Africa (Sunnyside : Jacana Media Ltd ., 2008), 39. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Kline, "The National Union," 142. 
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'60s, the Communist Party influenced the activities of the ANC. Communists were given 
assistance by the Soviet Union, which placed the South African state in a precarious 
· · 43 pos1t10n. 
I 
Lloyd Eby's article, "Communism, Totalitarianism, and the African National 
Congress," is a scathing indictment of the ANC/CPSA alliance. His views are in line 
with Weyl's arguments on the danger of communism in South Africa. Eby claims that the 
communist-influenced ANC was a supporter of terrorism and murder. A victorious ANC 
would result in the creation of a communist regime under the control of the Soviet Union. 
The article argues that the CPSA had a strong influence over Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), 
the military arm of the ANC/CPSA alliance. 44 Eby warns against the danger of achieving 
national liberation while overlooking the threat posed by the CPSA. An alliance with 
communism w~rnld usher in greater oppression in the form of a Marxist dictatorship of 
the proletariat.45 
Like the previous two articles, Morgan Norval's Inside the ANC is another 
Nationalist interpretation that portrays the ANC as a dangerous political movement. 
Norval argues that peace in South Africa could be achieved if all competing factions 
peacefully negotiated and reached a compromise. However, the communist dominated 
ANC/CPSA alliance was committing .acts of terrorism and murder to bully its way to a 
position of power in any future political negotiations. Norval argues that revolutionary 
43 Nathaniel Weyl, Traitor's End {New York: Arlington House, 1970), 9. 
44 Lloyd Eby, "Communism, Totalitarianism, and the African National Congress," International Journal on 




change in South African must not be allowed to occur, since the communist-influenced 
ANC would use its popularity with the African people to establish a pro-Soviet state.46 
Radical interpretations fall in line with the views held by the Multiracial Congress 
Alliance. The ANC leads this partnership which also includes the African Indian 
Congress (AIC), the African People's Organization (APO), as well as the CPSA. The 
predominant ideology is strongly anti-conservative, as illustrated by the ANC' s 
demonstrations against D. F. Malan's Purified Nationalist Party after its 1948 electoral 
victory.47 As a member of the CPSA, Harold Wolpe 's "Strategic Issues in the Struggle 
for National Liberation in South Africa" is a radical perspective on the conflict between 
the ANC/CPSA alliance and the Nationalist government. Wolpe argues that to 
conceptualise the struggle against apartheid in primarily racial terms fails to properly 
examine the problems of class interests, as well as the subsequent alliances made 
between various social classes in the black population. With the electoral victory of the 
Purified Nationalist Party, South Africa experienced a political shift through the 
subordination of the black population to white interests. This shift followed the 
implementation of apartheid, a political system in which only whites could participate in 
~ "bourgeois democratic form of parliamentary government." The 1950s in South Africa 
were marked by the increased coercive power of the state, which forced the ANC and the 
CPSA to escalate their resistance through the implementation of political action and mass 
mobilization campaigns against the state ' s oppressive legislation.48 
46 Morgan Norval, Inside the ANC (Washington: Selous Foundation Press, 1990), 27. 
47 
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Martin Legassick's article, "South Africa in Crisis: What Route to Democracy?" 
examines the country's political and social conflict from a South African communist 
perspective. Legassick explains that South Africa's problems are neither racial nor 
cultural; instead, they are issues of class conflict between capitalists and workers.49 At 
the heart of the matter is the idea that apartheid is not only a means of racial and cultural 
division but also a system designed to maintain the privileged position of the capitalist 
class. so Legassick claims that two-thirds of the black population supported the armed 
struggle against apartheid undertaken by the ANC/CPSA alliance in the 1960s. Both 
organizations would have a difficult time abandoning their military operations for fear of 
losing the African people's support. 51 Wolpe and Legassick emphasize the primacy of 
class conflict in the struggle against apartheid. Both authors view the escalation of 
resistance by t~e ANC and the Communist Party as a necessary response in the face of 
increasing government oppression. 
In Thomas K. Ranuga's The New South Africa and the Socialist Vision, we have a 
radical examination of the history of the ANC/CPSA alliance. Ranuga, unlike Wolpe and 
Legassick, focuses on the issue of communist influence in the ANC. One of his main 
arguments is that communists never controlled the ANC. The only A C leader closely 
associated with Marxism was J. T. Gumede who served as president general of the ANC 
from 1927 to 1930. However, the ANC ousted him from power during the 1930s because 
of his involvement with the Communist Party. Gumede was replaced by the conservative 
49 Martin Legassick, "South Africa in Crisis: What Route to Democracy?" African Affairs 84 (Oct., 1985), 
www.jstor.org (accessed: 18 January, 2013), 588-589. 




leader Pixley ka Isaka Seme, who ensured that the ANC would not tolerate Marxist 
influence. 52 The creation of the Congress Youth League in 1944 also brought about a 
more militant form of nationalism in the ANC. The majority of the Youth League 's 
members were strongly anti-communist. They did not trust communist class analysis 
since it was seen as a foreign ideology which the CPSA could use to subvert the ANC's 
· 53 mterests . 
While various ideological interpretations have already been made regarding the 
history of the CPSA and its relations with the ANC, a certain gap remains within the 
literature. An analysis of the changes the Communist Party underwent in order to ally 
itself with the ANC is still somewhat incomplete. Furthermore, most of these 
examinations were written before the publications of Joe Slovo and Nelson Mandela' s 
respective auto~iographies. These two primary sources provide a wealth of new 
information regarding the ANC and CPSA's interactions. Unlike the liberal and 
nationalist historiographical interpretations I previously highlighted, my focus is not on 
the degree of communist control in the ANC. Instead, I examine the ideological conflict 
the CPSA underwent in order to adapt to the South African setting and how this, in tum, 
impacted the power dynamic in the ANC/CPSA alliance. This historical examination is 
more closely related to Harold Wolpe.and Martin Legassick's class/race discussion. 
The Development of Early CPSA Ideology and the Issue of National Liberation 
The success of communism in the Russian Revolution in 1917 ensured that South 
African socialists became heavily influenced by Russian communist ideology. After 1917 
52 




the International Socialist League began publishing material from the Russian communist 
newspaper "Pravda."54 South Africa's social problems were viewed through a classic 
Marxist lens and primary focus was given to the class struggle between workers and 
capitalists. 55 The racial oppression of Africa'ns was not emphasised. Subsequently, the 
ISL believed it could unite both African and white workers into a single labour 
organization to oppose capitalist exploitation.56 The common argument was that the 
racial and economic differences between Africans and whites would not inhibit a union 
of the South African proletariat. Socialists claimed they could apply the same 
organizational methods used by Russian communists in order to combat Smuts's Union 
government. 
In 1921 the ISL merged with various socialist organizations to create the 
Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA). Like its socialist predecessor the CPSA once 
again invited all workers, irrespective of race, to unite with the World Communist 
International. The difference between the Communist Party and the ISL was in the 
greater focus the CPSA placed on the recruitment and indoctrination of workers. 
Communists accused the Labour Party of being reformist in nature and of catering to the 
1vfote middle class while workers' needs were ignored. The CPSA decided that an 
aggressive indoctrination campaign aimed at workers was insufficient as a strategy. The 
Communist Party concluded it would need the flexibility to use any social umest in the 
54 
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country to further the cause of the proletariat. 57 Such discontent soon came in the form of 
the 1922 Strike, which was organized by white workers when the Chamber of Mines 
diminished their pay. Even though the CPSA had not organized the strike, it nonetheless 
offered its support to the striking workers, since the Communist Party saw the strike as a 
means to oppose capitalism. The argument was that supporting the white workers would 
bring the CPSA closer to defeating the South African state. 58 The 1922 Strike highlighted 
the difficulties the CPSA experienced in attempting to create a racially united labour 
front. In its support for white labour, the Communist Party failed to include African 
workers in the demands for higher pay and skilled employment. The Strike itself was 
racially exclusive, since whites refused to include African workers in the labour dispute. 
Thus, the CPSA was placed in the difficult position of choosing sides. To make matters 
worse, the stri~e was unsuccessful and the majority of white workers abandoned the 
Communist Party in favour of the Labour and Nationalist parties. 59 
Even as early as 1915, socialists exerted a great deal of effort to include the urban 
African workforce in the class struggle. The International Socialist League encouraged 
Africans to support white unions in an attempt to create a unified labour front. From its 
inception in 1921, the CPSA employed the same policy in the immediate years. 60 
However, as early as 1928, communists began to seriously question if a united front 
57 Communist Party of South Africa, "Manifesto of the Communist Party of South Africa," in Fifty Fighting 
Years, ed. A. Lerumo (London: lnkululeko Publications, 1971), 117-119. 
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between African and white workers remained a possibility to be pursued. In 1928, the 
Communist International ' s Executive Committee argued that South Africa' s inherent 
social, economic, and political problems made it practically impossible for communists 
to appeal to both African and white workers. The Executive Committee made certain key 
observations, such as the fact that the overall African population at the time had 
increased to roughly 5,500,000, while whites numbered 1,500,000. Despite the fact that 
Africans were the overwhelming demographic majority, they were only legally entitled 
to 13 percent of the country' s territory, while whites claimed the rest. Furthermore, there 
was no African bourgeoisie to speak of, while the vast majority of the country ' s working 
class was African. In the industrial and transportation sectors, Africans numbered 
420,000, while whites only comprised a tally of 145,000. In the agricultural sector, there 
were 435,000 ~frican labourers as opposed to only 50,000 whites . The Executive 
Committee understood that the proportion of African workers within the country grew 
faster than that of whites. Furthermore, African employees earned much less than their 
white counterparts due to racially discriminatory labour practices. 61 
The Communist International's Executive Committee realized it was imperative 
to accelerate the recruitment of Africans into the CPSA. Even as early as the mid- l 920s, 
communists were active in the Industrial and Commercial Workers ' Union of South 
Africa (I CU). The I CU was created in 1919 and operated as a general union for African 
workers and peasants. By the late 1920s the ICU had 100,000 members and was deeply 
involved in trade unionism and matters of African nationalism. 62 While Africans 
61 Executive Committee of the Communist International, "The South African Question," in Fifty Fighting 
Years, ed. A. Lerumo (London: lnkululeko Publications, 1971), 126-127. 
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comprised the overwhelming majority of the country 's labour force, they faced serious 
discrimination in the workplace. Communists were well aware of these issues and sought 
to use them to further the goals of the CPSA. In tum, this action brought the Communist 
I 
Party closer to acknowledging South Africa's racial problems. 
The widening split between white and African workers was further increased by 
the policies of the Labour Party of South Africa. In 1915 this organization split away 
from the International Socialist League and began to favour racial policies that benefitted 
white labour at the expense of African workers. By 1922 the majority of miners working 
in the Transvaal were poor Afrikaners displaced from their farms due to an economic 
depression in the 1920s. The Labour Party and Hertzog's Nationalist Party both drew 
their support from this impoverished demographic. In 1923, both political parties entered 
into a close alliance which formed the main opposition to Smuts ' s Union government. 63 
The Communist Intemational's Executive Committee understood that this alliance sought 
to benefit white labour at the expense of African workers. The CPSA accused the Labour 
Party of indoctrinating white workers with a racist ideology. 64 
In 1926 communists were expelled from the fast-growing Industrial and 
Commercial Workers' Union of South Africa (ICU). Its leadership was at odds with 
communist ideology and feared that the CPSA would attempt to gain control of the 
ICU. 65 The Executive Committee interpreted this expulsion as the work of black 
reformist leaders corrupted by the Labour and Nationalist parties. Communists feared 
63 Lerumo, "The Turn to the Masses," 55-56. 
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their fallout with the ICU could lead to the political marginalization of the CPSA.66 The 
interests of white and African workers were in discord due to legislation introduced by 
the state to control African unions. The 1924 Industrial Conciliation Act did not legally 
recognize unions that included Africans in their membership, and racially inclusive 
labour unions were not allowed to operate in the work place.67 However, Africans still 
had the right to strike to address political grievances due to a loophole in the legal 
system. Agreements between trade unions and employers that took Africans into 
consideration were not legally enforceable in the country. The Executive Committee 
highlighted the difficulties this created in maintaining a united labour front. White 
workers chose to side with the state to maintain their privileged position to the detriment 
of African workers. 68 The Afrikaner Broederbond, created in 1919, was a secret 
organization th!:lt chan1pioned Boer interests. One of its main objectives was to make sure 
Afrikaner trade unions were not influenced by outside sources such as communism. 
During the 1930s and '40s, the Broederbond became a major supporter of Malan 's 
Purified Nationalist Party, which helped to diminish the Communist Party ' s appeal 
among the white labour movement. 69 
The Communist International's Executive Committee initially examined the 
South African problem through Marxist principles of class conflict and capitalist 
exploitation. It saw Smuts's Union government and Hertzog' s Nationalist Party as an 
alliance between British capitalism and Boer bourgeoisie, which increased the black 
66 Executive Committee of the Communist International, "The South African Question," 128. 
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population' s economic exploitation.70 However, Marxist interpretations had to eventually 
consider the South African context. By 1928, the Communist Party of South Africa had 
grown in size, numbering 1,750 members, of which 1,600 were coloured or African. 
Communists were thus compelled to consider the racial problems faced by African 
workers, who were hit especially hard by Hertzog's Nationalist Party during the 1920s. 71 
The Creswell Wage Act of 1925 and the Mines and Works Amendment Act of 1926 
caused thousands of Africans to lose their jobs in skilled positions as they were replaced 
by white workers who received higher rates of pay. 72 The state successfully courted 
white workers by placing their interests at odds with those of African workers, which 
forced the Communist International ' s Executive Committee to acknowledge that class 
analysis was insufficient when tackling South Africa' s problems. The racial factor that 
drove the Unioi;i government and the Nationalist Party to enact their segregationist 
policies had to be taken into account. Furthermore, an organization comprised of 1,750 
supporters was by no means a mass movement, thus some communists claimed that a 
change of strategy was needed to increase the CPSA' s appeal in South Africa. 
By 1928 the Communist International' s Executive Committee regarded the 
CPSA's decision to create a united labour front between Africans and whites as a failed 
strategy. The CPSA had not placed sufficient attention on the issue of African national 
liberation, thus the Communist Party was urged to change its strategy away from class 
struggle and focus on national liberation. South Africa would become an independent 
republic free of white minority rule, thus the Communist Party was expected to place its 
70 Executive Committee of the Communist International, "The South African Question," 126. 
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ideology of class struggle on hold. The CPSA was to give primacy to racial issues such 
as segregation and African liberation.73 Initially the CPSA resisted the Executive 
Committee's new strategy. A delegation led by S. P. Bunting argued that the Executive 
Committee had incorrectly assumed that issues of national liberation took precedence 
over the class struggle. However, due to the CPSA's loyalty to the Communist 
International, the new strategy was adopted in 1929, although not without a great deal of 
internal opposition.74 Recalling the CPSA's change of strategy, Joe Slovo remarked that 
" ... in contrast to the position in 1922, the Party's membership was overwhelmingly 
black and its ideology had moved a long way towards an understanding that the main 
immediate content of the South African revolutionary endeavor is the national liberation 
of the African people."75 
The new focus on race and national liberation meant the CPSA would have to 
cooperate with the ANC - the most significant African organization in the country. The 
goal was to transform the ANC from a moderate liberal organization into a revolutionary 
force capable of challenging the South African government for control of the country. 
Communists planned to weaken the influence traditional chiefs had within the ANC. The 
CPSA believed the chiefs were collaborating with Hertzog's Nationalist Party. Some 
within the CPSA argued that the radicalization of the ANC should be the Communist 
Party's primary mission in order to achieve the Communist International's goal of 
73 Executive Committee of the Communist International, "The South African Question, 129. 
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creating an independent republic. 76 The CPSA's internal ideological debate between 
race-related issues such as African liberation versus the proletariat's class struggle 
against capitalism, ultimately served to create serious problems for the Communist Party 
in the following years. 
Communist Infighting and the Rise of the AN C's Youth League 
As a member of the CPSA and a Communist International representative, D. G. 
Wolton was convinced the CPSA was on the wrong path. He accused S. P. Bunting, the 
general secretary of the Communist Party, of leading a right wing movement within the 
organization. Wolton and Lazar Bach, a young communist of Latvian descent, instigated 
a leftist purge within the Communist Party, thus beginning a deep sectarianism, which 
led to the eventual removal of Bunting and important trade union leaders. With Bunting 
gone, Wolton became the new general secretary, a role Bach would later inherit. 
Together, Wolton and Bach claimed the Executive Committee's proposal for the CPSA 
to focus on race problems, such as African national liberation, meant for the Communist 
Party to organize a socialist revolution in South Africa. Their opponents, led by Moses 
Kotane who later became general secretary, countered that the Executive Committee had 
intended for the CPSA to organize a national democratic revolution and not a socialist 
one. Kotane's faction challenged Wolton and Bach's leadership, claiming the CPSA 
should work to understand and cater to the "masses" and their demands. 77 Wolton and 
Bach were accused of focusing on pointless doctrinal factors, such as the dispute between 
76 Executive Committee of the Communist International, "The South African Question," 131. 
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Stalin and Trotsky, while ignoring the fact they lived in a country whose population had 
never experienced the history of labour mobilisation seen by Europe. 78 The CPSA lost a 
great deal of its membership during the 1930s, with communists who favoured 
democratic revolution over the more traditional focus on socialist revolt being expelled 
from its ranks. 79 
The Communist Party's infighting is significant because it anticipated the 
eventual alliance between the ANC and the CPSA in two significant ways. Membership 
attrition weakened the CPSA, which meant it was in no position to significantly influence 
the ANC by the time the two organizations began working together in the 1940s. By the 
time of its banning in 1950, the Communist Party was small and needed to work through 
other political movements to remain relevant in the country's political scene. Slovo 
admitted that much: "It was becoming clearer than ever that the catalyst for real change 
in South Africa could only come from a challenge by the racially dominated. And this 
challenge was growing, more especially from the black workers."80 By 1935 the majority 
of the CPSA supported Kotane's focus on democratic revolution and Bach was 
expelled. 81 The CPSA became involved in race issues that affected the black population, 
s•1ch as segregation and racism. The Communist Party understood that the apartheid 
regime had to be removed before it could implement its doctrine of class conflict in order 
to create a dictatorship of the proletariat. The CPSA realized that its goal of creating an 
78 M. M. Kotane, "Letter to the Central Committee," in Fifty Fighting Years, ed. A. Lerumo (London : 
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independent republic could only be achieved through cooperation with a mass national 
liberation movement such as the ANC. 
While the CPSA recovered from its years of infighting, developments within the 
ANC further weakened the communist position in the eventual alliance. The ANC' s 
Youth League (YL) was created in 1944 at the Bantu Men's Social Center. The meeting 
was comprised of an elite group of young Africans, such as Oliver Tambo, Walter Sisulu, 
and Nelson Mandela, who were all educated at Fort Hare University. They were 
convinced that only African nationalism could solve racial oppression in South Africa. 82 
As Chief Albert Luthuli recalled: "The founding of the Congress Youth League had met 
a long-standing need, giving to young men a sphere of action, and assurance that the days 
of polite, unheeded complaint were over."83 The shared feeling was that the AN C' s 
leadership was too focused on protecting the rights of the African elite and as such was 
not concerned with the common African. Dr. A. P. Xuma was voted out of the AN C' s 
presidency, while the YL began preparations for a Program of Action designed to tum 
the ANC into a mass movement through the implementation of "confrontational protests, 
boycotts, and passive resistance."84 The YL represented a more radical movement in the 
ANC, calling for the creation of a new South Africa based on racial equality. The country 
would become a democratic society in which all adult individuals could vote. 
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Furthermore, the YL vehemently rejected the notion that British and Afrikaner political 
parties cared for the well-being of the African people. 85 
While the YL sought to fuel African Nationalism and thus turn the ANC into a 
more radical organization that could actively fight for the rights of Africans, it was also 
deeply mistrustful of communist ideology. YL members saw Marxist principles as 
concepts that were foreign to South Africa and therefore could not be used to solve the 
country's troubled situation. Mandela expressed this sentiment, "We were," he noted, 
"extremely wary of communism ... Lembede felt that the Communist Party was 
dominated by whites, which undermined African self-confidence and initiative." Most 
within the YL argued that accepting communist help would lead to the weakening of 
African nationalism. The YL opposed the inclusion of whites into the AN C's nationalist 
movement on the grounds that Africans needed to stop being "enamored of white 
culture."86 
Some within the Youth League, including Mandela himself, became friends with 
communist activists; however, the YL still harboured a deep mistrust of communism. 
Mandela explains that he was opposed to the ANC working with communists because he 
frared the CPSA would dominate the ANC's leadership due to the Communist Party's 
experience and training. Mandela "believed that it was an undiluted African nationalism, 
not Marxism or multiculturalism, that would liberate us ... I even went so far as breaking 
up CP meetings by storming the stage ... "87 The YL sought to build a powerful African 






national movement to overthrow the Nationalist Party' s apartheid regime which 
oppressed the black population through the implementation of racist legislation. The 
strategy was opposed to the CPSA' s view that Africans were discriminated against as an 
economic class; instead, the YL argued that Africans were facing persecution primarily 
because of their race. 88 
While the ANC continued to allow communists to work within its ranks, it is 
apparent that the younger leadership, represented by Mandela and the Youth League 
(YL), was quite suspicious and antagonistic towards the CPSA. This atmosphere of 
mistrust and doubt made the new generation of ANC leaders wary of communist 
influences. Thus, if the CPSA wished to work with the ANC, it could not afford to 
engage in attempts to gain control of an already deeply suspicious ANC leadership. The 
CPSA's acceptance of the independent republic strategy served to placate the ANC, since 
it signified that the Communist Party accepted the need to focus on racial issues, such as 
African national liberation, before considering the class struggle. The fact that the YL 
had radicalized the ANC meant that the Communist Party no longer needed to weaken 
the authority of traditional chiefs in the ANC. Furthermore, the CPSA's infighting during 
tl.e 1930s had weakened the party by diminishing its membership. As such, if 
communists wanted to work with the ANC, they would have to abide by its rules . 
The CPSA and the ANC Forge Closer Ties 
Closer ties between the Communist Party and the ANC only really developed 
from the mid- l 940s onwards. The common challenges faced by both organizations 
forced their members to cooperate, thus increasing their interaction and familiarity with 
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one another. In 1946, after the end of the Second World War, a major event occurred in 
the Witwatersrand mining complex that changed the political setting in South Africa. The 
African Mine Workers' Union (AMWU), led by the CPSA's J.B. Marks, organized a 
strike against the Chamber of Mines. The AMWU demanded better living conditions and 
higher pay, as well as the removal of War Measure 1425, which banned union meetings 
in the mining complex. The Chamber of Mines refused to negotiate with the AMWU. 
Therefore, from August 12-19, the AMWU launched a massive strike in which 100,000 
African workers participated, thus bringing a significant portion of the mining industry to 
a halt. Smuts's United Party crushed the strike through violence and repression. 
AMWU's leaders, as well as the CPSA's general secretary, Moses Kotane, were accused 
of conspiracy to initiate the labour dispute. 89 The Communist Party's entire Johannesburg 
wing supported the AMWU's mass strike. Slovo recalled that:" ... at night we 
maneuvered our way in a borrowed car around the mining areas between Springs and 
Braamfontein, looking for opportunities to put up posters and throw leaflets over the 
guarded work-prisons of the black miners."90 
The African Mine Workers' Union itself had been created jointly by members 
from both the ANC and the CPSA. Some of these activists, including J.B. Marks, 
belonged to both organizations. Like the Communist Party, the ANC dedicated 
considerable resources towards helping the AMWU. During the strike, Mandela worked 
in close cooperation with Marks in the mining complex to formulate the AMWU's 
strategy. When recalling these events, Mandela noted that: "The strike was the beginning 
of my close relationship with Marks ... we discussed my opposition to communism at 
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great length ... I had these same discussions with Moses Kotane and Yusuf Dadoo, both 
of whom believed, like Marks, that communism had to be adapted to the African 
situation.',91 During the weeklong strike, many ANC and CPSA activists forged closer 
ties, which were made possible by the CPSA's acceptance of the independent republic 
strategy, which championed racial issues over those of class. 92 The Communist Party's 
involvement on the side of African workers was a perfect example of the CPSA dealing 
with racial issues, such as workplace discrimination. The strike helped the CPSA reach a 
common understanding with the ANC on the urgent need to end the apartheid regime. 
Furthermore, by 1946 the majority of the Communist Party's membership was African, 
which must have helped convince the Youth League to soften its anti-communist 
stance.93 The AMWU's strike was the first serious campaign to bring ANC and CPSA 
activists together against a common enemy represented by Smuts's United Party. 
The 1946 strike brought to the fore the power that African workers could wield 
against the state due to their ability for mass mobilisation. The white population was 
likely scared into voting more extreme elements into power during the 1948 elections. It 
was during this year that Malan's Purified Nationalist Party ran on its racist apartheid 
election platform and ultimately defeated Smuts's United Party. After their victory, the 
Nationalists moved to consolidate their power by terminating the right to vote still 
available to a minority of coloured people. White political representatives who spoke for 
Africans were also removed from the political system. In 1950, the Purified Nationalist 
Party banned the CPSA under the Suppression of Communism Act. Ten years later, the 
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ANC was also declared an illegal organization. Furthermore, the Nationalist government 
gave itself the legislative power to declare any organization illegal. The state also 
assumed the power to censor individuals and to confine them to house arrest without trial 
in the judicial system.94 
Malan's Nationalist government was quick to implement its apartheid system, 
which was modelled on the segregationist policies present in South Africa prior to the 
1948 elections. Apartheid's core concepts were based on racial separation, preservation 
of political institutions for whites only, segregation of urban and rural areas, control of 
African movement to cities, greater racial separation of the labour market, and 
segregation of public facilities. The Nationalists "Afrikanerized" the state apparatus to 
ensure they maintained power. Thus, Afrikaners were placed in key areas in the state, 
such as the army and the intelligence departments. The new Nationalist regime under 
Malan quickly created new legislation to reflect its apartheid ideology. The year 1950 
saw the creation of the Immorality Act, which banned marriage and sexual relations 
"across racial boundaries."95 The Group Areas Act in 1950 and the Prevention of Illegal 
Squatting Act in 1951, allowed the Nationalist government to racially divide urban land 
and move people across the new racial boundaries. During 1953, the Reservation of 
Separate Amenities Act was passed, which allowed the government to create racially 
divided and unequal public facilities. 96 
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As a direct response to these racist policies passed against the black population, 
the ANC implemented the Youth League's Program of Action in order to transform the 
ANC into a national mass movement. Reqilling the implementation of the AN C's new 
strategy, Mandela wrote that: "the Youth League had seen the failure oflegal and 
constitutional means to strike at racial oppression; now the entire organization was set to 
enter a more activist stage." The ANC was to use new strategies, such as strikes, 
boycotts, passive resistance, and stay-at-homes, to defy the Nationalists and their 
apartheid regime. 97 
The CPSA itself was unprepared for its ban under the Nationalist Suppression of 
Communism Act in 1950. Its Central Committee, headed by Moses Kotane, announced 
that the Communist Party would be disbanded. Slovo recalled, "most of us were stunned 
by the Central Committee announcement that in the face of the ban the Party had no 
option but to dissolve itself."98 After the initial shock wore off, ex-party members such as 
Slovo, convened and indicated their desire to reconstitute the CPSA as an underground 
organization. The old Central Committee was informed that unless it took steps to 
reconstitute the Communist Party, veteran members would move to create a separate 
organization. However, many comm~ists were not prepared to re-join the CPSA in an 
illegal manner, and membership suffered. To show the organization's new status as an 
underground movement, its name was changed from the CPSA to that of the SACP.99 
Due to the Communist Party ' s illegality, communists who sought to (officially) continue 
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their political activism in the country had to operate through other legal organizations. 
Thus they became more involved with the ANC, which was the largest African-based 
organization in the country. From 1950 to 1960, SACP members devoted considerable 
effort and time to the AN C's goal of overthrowing the Nationalist Party and its apartheid 
regime. It was during the 1950s that the ANC/SACP alliance was finalized, prompting 
one of the AN C's main leaders, Oliver Tambo, to claim that the SACP and ANC were 
the "two pillars" of the "liberation movement". 100 Simply put, communists who wanted 
to remain relevant as political activists had no other choice but to operate through legal 
organizations such as the ANC. It was not only the safest alternative available, but it also 
went hand in hand with the principles of the independent republic strategy, where issues 
of race such as African liberation and the destruction of apartheid, were given primacy 
over class ideology. Furthermore, the newly reformed and renamed SACP had been 
weakened from the party's infighting during the 1930s. Its membership was small, and it 
had lost even more influence in the country due to its banning. Working with the ANC 
became the only real viable alternative in order to remain relevant in South Africa. 
During a meeting of the ANC and African Indian Congress (AIC) it was proposed 
that the various South African liberation movements could no longer afford to remain 
divided. The Communist Party's ban in 1950 and apartheid's oppressive policies 
constituted a danger which could not be ignored. Dr. Yusuf Dadoo, a prominent member 
of the AIC and the SACP, agreed with Nelson Mandela, who represented the AN C's 
Youth League, that the Communist Party's ban constituted a serious danger to all other 
liberation movements. South African activists would have to create a united front in 
order to oppose the Nationalist government. It was at this meeting that Oliver Tambo 
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stated that: "Today it is the Communist Party. Tomorrow it will be our trade unions, our 
Indian Congress, our APO, our African National Congress." In response to the 
Suppression of Communism Act, as well as the murder of eighteen Africans by the police 
on May 1, the ANC, the AIC, the APO, and the SACP united to stage a National Day of 
Protest on June 26, 1950. 101 The SACP's hopes of creating an alliance with the ANC 
were finally realized once the Nationalists began to threaten all liberation movements 
with the possibility of illegality. The Communist Party's banning influenced the ANC 
into joining ranks with the SACP, a goal many communists harbored since 1928, when 
the independent republic strategy had been introduced by the Communist International's 
Executive Committee. The creation of the ANC/SACP alliance had nothing to do with 
communist persuasion; instead, the Nationalist government had become far too great a 
threat for the ANC to be able to afford the luxury of operating without allies. 
The 1950s saw numerous campaigns launched by the ANC and its communist 
allies against the apartheid regime. The campaigns included the 1950 Defend Free 
Speech Convention, which had made May 1st a "People's Holiday," all the way to the 
massive 1952 Defiance Campaign where a total of 8000 individuals voluntarily chose to 
be arrested for their opposition to the Nationalist government's racist legislation. 102 Over 
the course of its five-month duration, the Defiance Campaign received a great deal of 
support and publicity, which ultimately resulted in the registered membership of the 
ANC rising from 20,000 to 100,000 members. In response, the Nationalist regime felt 
threatened by the campaign's racial unity, which was a direct challenge to its policy of 
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racial separation. The Nationalists claimed that the protests were led by communist 
agitators, and passed new legislation in 1953 that successfully stopped the Defiance 
Campaign. The subsequent passing of the Public Safety Act allowed the government to 
arrest people and incarcerate them without trial while also declaring martial law. The 
Laws Amendment Act was later introduced to allow the Nationalist regime to use 
"corporal punishment" against protesters. 103 
Due to cooperation between SACP and ANC members in the various national 
liberation campaigns of the 1950s, some of the ANC's apprehension regarding 
communism began to break down. Fellow activists from both organizations started to see 
each other as comrades in arms against a common enemy. Mandela wrote that: "Because 
of my friendship with Kotane," among others, "and my observation of their own 
sacrifices, I was finding it more and more difficult to justify my prejudice against the 
party." 104 Mandela saw these SACP members primarily as activists who had made 
serious sacrifices and risked being persecuted by the Nationalist government in order to 
contribute to the cause of African national liberation. Communists started to be judged 
based on their contributions towards the ANC's goals and not on their ideology. 
Mandela immersed himself in Marxist philosophy to gain more insight regarding 
his communist allies. To his surprise, he was able to relate his experiences as a freedom 
fighter to Marxist calls for revolution against the status quo. The fact that communists, 
and in particular, the Soviet Union, were willing to support national liberation 
movements in third-world countries softened Mandela's views regarding the inclusion of 
communists in the ANC's ranks. Mandela claimed he saw no contradiction between the 
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ideology of "African nationalism" and communism. He was primarily an "African 
nationalist" engaged in the liberation of South Africa from the rule of a white elite 
representing a minority of the population. Mandela wrote that as a freedom fighter, he 
was prepared to use any ideology and any means necessary to defeat apartheid and to 
remove "human prejudice" from South Africa. He explained that as revolutionaries, 
communists and African nationalists had much more in common as opposed to what 
divided them. Mandela concluded that he did not need to become a Marxist in order to 
cooperate with communists against the apartheid regime. While some have questioned 
the degree of communist control over the ANC, Mandela cautioned that the ANC itself 
may very well have been the one who used the SACP to accomplish its own goals of 
national liberation. 105 
From Mandela's recounting of his dealings with the SACP while engaged in the 
liberation of the country, it is apparent that he started to tolerate communism. He saw that 
prominent SACP members such as Moses Kotane, J. B. Marks, and Joe Slovo were all 
extremely committed to the AN C's cause of national liberation. They were devoted 
liberation fighters and Mandela chose to overlook their Marxist ideology and instead 
focus on their contributions to African national liberation. 106 The A C's president, Chief 
Albert Luthuli, made the following remark regarding communist involvement in the 
ANC: 
There are Communists in the South African resistance, and .. . our primary 
concern is liberation, and we are not going to be sidetracked by ideological 
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clashes and witch hunts. Nobody in Congress may use the organisation to further 
any aims but those of Congress. 
Luthuli further clarified why the SACP was allowed to work with the ANC: "When I co-
l 
operate with Communists in Congress affairs I am not co-operating with Communism. 
We leave our differing political theories on one side until the day of liberation, and in the 
meantime we are co-operating in a defined area, in the cause of liberation."
107 
The ANC 
leadership was not interested in Marxist ideology; however, it was also not prepared to 
refuse a useful ally such as the CPSA. 
As I stated previously, the SACP never achieved a mass following. In fact, its 
membership had decreased during the infighting of the 1930s; with the banning of the 
CPSA numerous communists declined to join the SACP as underground activists. The 
banning of the Communist Party also meant that its members were only able to work 
effectively within the ANC' s ranks. Therefore, the SACP operated from a position of 
weakness in its dealings with the ANC, which was a mass movement that still enjoyed 
legal recognition until 1960. As such, communists could not afford to risk losing their 
only avenue to political relevancy in South Africa through an attempt at converting the 
A C into a communist puppet. There was no need for the SACP to take such a course of 
action. Marxists had already adopted the independent republic strategy, which called for 
the SACP to aid the ANC in achieving national liberation of outh Africa. As such, the 
immediate and practical goals for the two organizations were the same and they both 
regarded the urban African workforce as their main support base. Thus, the A C and the 
SACP had to deal with a common set of demands from their constituents, such as 
107 Luthuli, Let my people go, 154. 
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responding to the deterioration of African social and economic standards due to the 
implementation of the Purified Nationalist Party ' s apartheid regime. 
Communists saw themselves as the guardians of the liberation struggle, and it was 
during the mass movements of the 1950s that the SACP was put to the test. The 
Communist Party's Central Committee operated on an almost constant basis in order to 
examine all the major issues facing the ANC/SACP alliance in its numerous campaigns 
against the apartheid regime. Joe Slovo remarked that the SACP had achieved its 
respected position in the ANC's ranks through the means of "persuasion and example" 
and not with "caucus and manipulation." As Slovo himself acknowledged, due to the 
SACP's tight knit and structured nature, it had a "powerful organizational position"; 
however, the SACP's leader, Moses Kotane, discouraged the Communist Party from 
attempting to dominate the ANC's decision making process, fearing this would lead to 
sectarianism. Slovo recognized that Kotane's manner of dealing with the A C was the 
main contributing factor which influenced the ANC to accept an alliance with the ACP. 
He was well respected by all liberation fighters, and the ANC's leader, Chief Albert 
Luthuli, considered Kotane to be one of his closest advisors. 108 Kotane's strong and 
ggressive leadership style helped significantly with the A C's acceptance of the ACP. 
Kotane's abrasive leadership style conv.inced the A C that he was not a weak leader 
influenced by white communists. Slovo recalled that Kotane had no problem exercising 
his authority over white Marxists whom he perceived to challenge him. "Kotane·s 
confidence in himself and his assertive, often bullying style (which knew no color bar) 
made an enormous contribution to the acceptance of the Party as a truly indigenous 
108 Slovo, Slovo, 128. 
41 
- _.,. """ -· · ~ - . ~ -· - - - - - - ~ - - ~ .... - . 
force." 109 As an African comn uni s t, ot ·111 • 11) do11hl f111111tl ,t 11111 Ii 
national liberation struggle. I Jc mosl l1k ly 111f h1 ·11 
immediate problem facing ' oulh Al ri ca, uch ' 1 , th1 
regime. As an African, it is likely tha Ko mi· con .id r · l th 
oppression as an obstacle which had to b~ r mov · l 
in earnest. Therefore, at least or the imc h in 11 
goals. 
Even afte its reconstitution a an n! 
ontinu d to adhere to a democra 'c 
g1 en 
(> p 
·-· •• _ • ..,,. , .. • ,,. "' ·-~--- "• ·~ ••··•• ,.. ..... ~ ..,..,..,,..,..,..r•..-·,r,--. --·• __ ,.,,_ __ • 
In 1959 the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) split from the ANC in protest against 
the inclusion of "non-Africans," which was similar to the race-class wrangling that the 
Communist Party had to contend with. However, unlike the ANC, the PAC did not 
believe in multiracialism; it denounced the ANC for being under the control of whites, 
for not being radical enough, and for being dominated by communists. 111 On March 21 , 
1959, the PAC held a demonstration in the Sharpeville township; police fired upon the 
unarmed demonstrators, killing 69 people that day. 112 Many of those who died were 
women and childrvn shot from behind while attempting to flee. South Africa came under 
heavy criticism from the international community, including the United Nations Security 
Council. The Nationalist government insisted that the violence at Sharpeville was a 
scheme designed by communists seeking to destabilize the country. 113 The ANC and its 
communist allies decided that a strike had to be organized to protest the killings, while 
sympathy generated by the brutal attack would also be used to launch a campaign against 
South Africa's despised pass laws. To organise the upcoming campaigns, a decision 
making group was created, which included Mandela and Slovo, among others. 
114 
On 
March 28, hundreds of thousands of Africans responded to the AN C's call and remained 
in their homes, while fifty thousand people protested the shootings in the township of 
Langa. In response, the state declared martial law and cancelled the right to habeas 
corpus. 115 
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As a result of the mass protests, the Nationalist government banned the ANC in 
1960. It was during the era of 1960 to 1963 that the SACP made its greatest contribution 
to the ANC and its cause of national liberation. Once the ANC had become an illegal 
entity, it faced a whole other set of problems for which it was not initially prepared. The 
ANC, unlike the Communist Party, was a mass movement, which made it much harder 
for it to operate in a clandestine and illegal manner. Like the Communist Party, the ANC 
contained leadership elements that were unprepared for operating in an underground 
· • 116 orgamzat10n. 
By the beginning of the 1960s, the ANC's campaigns were losing support from 
the people. The latest stay-at-home drive was a failure due to lack of participation. 
Mandela had become disillusioned with the ANC's strategy, claiming that because the 
Nationalist Party was destroying nonviolent protests through the use of its armed forces, 
the ANC needed to respond by changing its tactics. The SACP had just formally 
announced its reconstitution and was planning to create its own military branch. Mandela 
believed the time had come for the ANC to turn to armed struggle, and he proposed this 
idea to the ANC's Working Committee. Mandela's proposal was defeated by the SACP's 
General Secretary, Moses Kotane, who was also one of the more powerful members of 
the AN C's Executive Committee. Kotane countered that the old ways of nonviolent 
protest were still viable; if the ANC turned to armed struggle then a great deal of 
individuals could be hurt. 117 At a separate meeting, Mandela explained that the ANC 
could no longer continue to operate by the standards of nonviolence when the state used 
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armed oppression against Africans. He argued that Kotane still saw the ANC as a legal 
organization even though it had been banned by the state. If the ANC did not act, it 
risked losing its hold on the populace, which had begun resorting to instances of armed 
struggle against the Nationalist government. Upon hearing these arguments, Kotane 
relented in his opposition, and Mandela was able to get the next Working Committee to 
accept the armed struggle proposal. 118 
Kotane was obviously well respected throughout the ANC to successfully oppose 
Mandela's proposal. However, as a communist within the ANC, Kotane worked from a 
position of weakness. The SACP had to constantly operate within the parameters of 
national liberation so as not to estrange the ANC. While Kotane might have been 
persuaded by Mandela's arguments, it is also likely he did not wish to create divisions 
between the SA~P and ANC. Mandela was a member of the Youth League who had 
originally opposed the inclusion of communists in the ANC. Even though he eventually 
accepted the SACP as a valuable ally despite the organization's Marxist ideology, Kotane 
was fully aware of Mandela's past opposition. Communists were accepted in the ANC 
because they were hard-working liberation fighters who muted their communist ideology 
in favour of supporting African national liberation. It is highly likely that Kotane 
discontinued his opposition to Mandela;s proposal so as not to gain an enemy who could 
create a rift between the ANC and SACP. This would indicate that the Communist Party 
had to be careful not to step out of line within the ANC. 
In 1961 the A C's National Executive accepted the Working Committee's 
decision to commence the armed struggle. Chief Luthuli advised the rest of the A C 
leadership to keep this decision a secret in order to protect the organization's allies, such 
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as the African Indian Congress and the African People's Organization. The Nationalist 
government had not yet banned these liberation movements. The ANC and SACP ' s plan 
was to keep this military organization subordinate to their orders, while it would give the 
appearance of operating as a separate entity with no affiliation to the ANC/SACP 
alliance. Mandela was authorized to oversee the ANC's military wing while working 
with whomever he deemed fit in order to lead the armed struggle.
11 9 
The new military 
institution, named Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), publicly presented itself as a distinct 
entity seeking to support the national liberation movement.
120 
Mk was run in an 
egalitarian manner by the ANC and SACP, while its High Command was comprised of 
Mandela and Slovo who represented their respective organizations. Together, the two 
revolutionaries decided on which individuals would complete MK's High Command 
structure. However, Mandela and Slovo's decisions had to be approved by the 
ANC/SACP alliance.
121 
Even though communists played an important role in the creation of MK, they 
were unable to gain an advantage in its leadership. The close working association 
between the ANC and the SACP meant that MK was run in a fair and friendly manner 
between communists and non-communists alike. After the leaderships of both the ANC 
and the SACP had been neutralized in South Africa by the Nationalist government, MK 
fell primarily under the influence and control of the AN C's foreign operation in 
Tanzania. After 1963, it took time for the SACP to rebuild an effective and centralized 
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leadership outside South Africa. The ANC was operating primarily out of Tanzania, 
whose government favoured the PAC over the ANC. It perceived the PAC as being more 
militant and more revolutionary because it did not have white communists in its ranks. 
Therefore, the ANC's alliance with the Communist Party became somewhat problematic, 
and the SACP had to tread very lightly so as not to create suspicion among the Tanzanian 
government. 122 
By the time that the armed struggle had begun, the SACP was distributing 
propaganda material after its reconstitution in 1960. In the 1962 document, "The Road to 
South African Freedom," the SACP issued an appeal for the righteousness of its cause as 
a part of the national liberation movement. The Communist Party sought to reach 
Africans by writing of the injustice of the political and social situation in South Africa, 
where three million whites held political and economic privilege over the majority of the 
African population, which numbered eleven million. 123 The document used Marxist 
philosophy to explain that the racial oppression within the country existed because of the 
exploitative nature of capitalism. However, communists made sure to state that the 
SACP's most urgent and immediate goal was that of African national liberation. The 
Communist Party's main objective was to unite all classes of the racially abused majority 
with the aims of creating a "national democratic revolution" to bring down the 
Nationalist government and its apartheid regime. Emphasis was placed on the fact that 
the national revolution would create African liberation and stop racial oppression. 
Furthermore, the Communist Party explained that the interests of the working class were 
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the same as those of the SACP itself, and with the overthrow of apartheid, the SACP 
would seek to create a democratic government that would guarantee "freedom and 
equality of rights." 124 Throughout this document, it is apparent that the SACP chose to 
largely ignore communist ideology in favour of supporting the ANC's goal of achieving 
national liberation. In many ways, the SACP was acting as a surrogate that supported the 
goals of the national liberation movement at the expense of its own Marxist ideology, 
which would normally call for a class war against the capitalist class. 
In 1963, the SACP's Central Committee released a document titled "The 
Revolutionary Way Out," which was written to win support for the ANC, SACP, and 
MK. In this document, the Communist Party explained that the Nationalist government 
had gone too far with its oppressive policies. Africans were ready to support banned 
organizations such as the ANC and the SACP, as well as an armed struggle against the 
Nationalist state. 125 The Communist Party declared the ANC to be the ideal African 
national liberation movement, while its struggle to overthrow apartheid could always 
depend on the full support of the SACP. 126 The document argues that SACP and ANC 
leaders should listen to the general populace's calls for a more forceful resistance against 
Nationalist oppression. Any action undertaken by the oppressed should be "principled" 
and represent the goals and tactics of the :'national leadership," or risk descending into 
"adventurism" and mere revenge without a carefully planned course of action.
127 
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defence of the ANC and the SACP alike, the document states that the Nationalist 
government was misinformed in its claim that the ANC had been overrun by 
communists. The ANC would never allow an outside force to control its leadership after 
having fought for so long to maintain its existence against the attacks of the Nationalist 
government. The document argues that the reason why the ANC and the SACP were able 
to work together was that both organizations shared the same goal of African national 
liberation. 128 
Throughout this document, we see that the SACP was once again attempting to 
promote the goals of the ANC/SACP alliance. It is evident that the Communist Party 
sought to defend MK and the turn to violence by justifying the need for an armed 
struggle against the Nationalist government, while also explaining that the ANC had not 
been taken over by communists. A great deal of concern was placed on the issue of 
African national liberation and supporting the ANC's goals. The communist ideology of 
class struggle was almost entirely absent. It is evident that the SACP muted its own 
ideological beliefs in order to work within the ANC's ranks. As such, the Communist 
Party reinforced the ANC's race-centred national liberation approach, while its own 
ideology of class struggle remained muted. 
Conclusion 
The ANC/SACP alliance was built out of the necessity to work together against a 
common enemy. The rise of Malan's Purified Nationalist Party during the 1948 elections 
instituted a much harsher form of segregation in the form of apartheid. Racist legislation 
made life increasingly more difficult for South Africa's black population. The Nationalist 
128 Ibid., 170-171. 
49 
government was also prepared to ban any organization it saw as a threat to its rule . The 
banning of the Communist Party in 1950 warned the ANC that the Nationalists would not 
hold back from muting all dissenting voices, not just those of the SACP. This made 
conditions more favourable for an ANC/SACP alliance. 
By 1928 The Communist Party began to entertain notions of working with the 
ANC in order to bring about the fall of capitalism. It was during this year that the 
Communist International ' s Executive Committee suggested to the CPSA that a united 
front between white and African workers was not a realistic possibility. The Executive 
Committee proposed that the CPSA had to accept that South Africa' s race problems took 
precedence over Marxist ideology of class conflict. This suggestion created internal 
debates within the Communist Party that lasted until the mid-1930s. However, by the end 
of these conflicts, the CPSA had accepted the Executive Committee' s proposal that the 
Communist Party should focus on creating an independent republic in South Africa 
through a democratic revolution. 
The Nationalist electoral victory in 1948 cemented the ANC/CPSA alliance; 
however, by this time there was no need for a communist takeover of the ANC, nor was 
such a thing a realistic possibility. By the 1950s, the ANC was led in large part by the 
Youth League, which was an educated group of African national liberation fighters who 
were strongly opposed to Marxism. Furthermore, the Communist Party was severely 
weakened due to its internal class-race conflicts. A great deal of the CPSA's membership 
had been reduced as a result of this infighting. By 1950, the CPSA was banned by the 
Nationalist government. Therefore, for communists to remain politically relevant in 
South Africa, they had to operate through the ANC. The Communist Party would not risk 
50 
losing its only lifeline to political relevancy by attempting to control the ANC. Thus the 
CPSA was willing to place its Marxist ideology on hold and become the AN C' s junior 
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